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The early thirteenth century saw the proliferation of legal texts intended to restrain the arbitrary1 
exercise of power while simultaneously reinforcing political authority. From Syria to Spain, 
charters of liberties blossomed from negotiations between varying permutations of king, 
bishops, barons and burghers. Some of these documents would, by the nineteenth century, 
become foundational to national myths, such as the Golden Bull of Hungary or, most famously, 
Magna Carta in England. Others, such as the Livre au roi or the Assizes of Antioch in Outremer, 
were forgotten along with the principalities that gave birth to them. Connections among the 
legal customaries that appeared during this generation have been remarked upon by historians, 
particularly on anniversaries for such national myths, as in June 2015 at the Magna Carta 
Conference.2 It therefore seems appropriate to use this volume, marking the octocentenary of 
the death of Simon V of Montfort in 1218, to shift the centre of gravity for such comparison 
away from a document with a great historical legacy and its attendant temptations to 
anachronism and teleology in order to explore instead a collection of customs that was not only 
very much of its time, but that never had a chance to be otherwise: Simon’s « constitution » for 
his conquests in the Albigensian Crusade, the Statutes of Pamiers. 
That is not to say that the Statutes have been immune to national myth-making. 
Promulgated on 1 December 1212 by a crusader-dominated parliament in Pamiers, they have 
been examined almost exclusively as part of wider narrative histories of the Albigensian 
Crusade and the expansion of the French state, and therefore seen primarily through the lens of 
military provision and cultural subjugation. Only three scholarly works to date, all in French, 
have been wholly dedicated to the Statutes: a pamphlet of 1856 by Firmin Laferrière, a detailed 
monograph by Pierre Timbal from 1949 and, most recently, an excellent feminist analysis by 
Marjolaine Raguin-Barthelmebs. The first two are concerned with the long-term impact of the 
legislation, rather than its historical context, and therefore address only the replacement of 
southern partible inheritance — evidence of a surviving Roman and written legal tradition — 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to the participants and attendees at the conference in Poitiers for their questions and comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. I also owe a debt of thanks to Profs Peter Edbury, David Carpenter, Stephen 
Church, Martyn Rady, Martin Aurell, Laurent Macé and Nicholas Vincent who also offered generous comments 
and criticism. All errors and failings of the argument are my own. 
2 « Statutes, Constitutions and a Golden Bull: Early European Parallels to Magna Carta », The Magna Carta 
Conference, British Library, 19 June 2015. The Statutes were also deliberately included among the items on 
display at the concurrent national exhibition of Magna Carta: Magna Carta. Law, Liberty, Legacy, dir. C. Breay, 
J. Harrison, London, 2015, p. 59. 
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by French male primogeniture.3 However, this legacy is derived from only three clauses in the 
entire document of forty-nine. These inheritance clauses — almost alone of the original 
Statutes, which were abolished by the Crown in much of the Midi after 1229 — survived, if 
only in those lordships retained by Montfortine partisans and their descendants.4 For her part, 
Raguin-Barthelmebs provides instead a welcome lexical examination of the forty-sixth statute, 
that restricting marriages by indigenous noblewomen. As such, she is also chiefly concerned 
with inheritance and French « colonisation ».5 But, as Prof. Sir James Holt reminds us in 
discussing Magna Carta, « [i]t is scarcely valid…to select this or that clause or group of clauses 
as typifying the quality of the Charter without establishing that the contemporary importance 
of these sections justifies their selection. »6 The same is true of the Statutes. Despite the « highly 
unusual circumstances » of their drafting during the Albigensian Crusade, they nevertheless 
shine in a wider constellation of charters and customaries issued to or written for similarly wide 
territories — kingdoms, principalities or counties, rather than particular towns or communes — 
in the same generation (c. 1200-c. 1220). 7  When studied comparatively, these sources 
illuminate not only the « contemporary importance » of the Statutes, but also their place amidst 
the currents of reform running through the first quarter of the thirteenth century. 
If the « colonial » dimension of the Statutes — their imposition of French inheritance 
custom — has been overemphasised, it nevertheless contributes to an essential impulse found 
in the legislation: the provision of reliable military service and the preservation of the peace. In 
the place of elective, partible inheritance, Simon of Montfort therefore introduced the 
unambiguous transmission of fiefs by primogeniture, even going so far as explicitly to forbid 
alms given to the Church in excess of a fifth of any estate. The insistence on French custom 
was included in both the main text of the Statutes as well as the separate provisions concluded 
specifically between Simon and his fellow crusaders, appended by the crusader’s seal to the 
rest of the document.8 Nor was Simon alone in seeing the importance of inheritance to the 
security of his principality. Around the turn of the century, King Aimery of Jerusalem probably 
commissioned the Livre au roi in an attempt to reinforce his throne and restore or reimagine 
                                                          
3 F. Laferrière, Mémoire sur les lois de Simon de Montfort et sur les coutumes d’Albi, Paris, 1856; P. Timbal, 
Un Conflit d’annexation au Moyen Âge. L’Application de la coutume de Paris au pays d’Albigeois, Toulouse and 
Paris, 1949. See also, e.g., the treatment in A. P. Evans, « The Albigensian Crusade », A History of the Crusades, 
dir. K. M. Setton, 2nd edn, Madison, Wisc., 1969-1989, 2: 296; M. Roquebert, L’Épopée cathare, Toulouse, 1970-
1989, 1: 510-13; or J. R. Strayer, The Albigensian Crusades, New York, 1971, p. 87, where he confidently 
proclaims that the Statutes’ « main purpose was to introduce French feudal law into the South. » For southern 
practice at the turn of the century, see e.g. Lo Codi: Eine Summa codicis in provenzalischer Sprache aus dem XII. 
Jahrhundert, ed. H. Fitting, F. Derrer, Halle and Zurich, 1906-1974, 1: 47-48, 52, 66-68, 200-02, 207-08, 2: 37-
38, 41, 50-52, 144-46, 149-50; Layettes, 1: 256, 261, 273-74, 277. 
4  Laferrière, Mémoire sur les lois…, p. 21-22; Timbal, Un Conflit…, p. 34-35, 36. Even so, French 
primogeniture was largely abandoned by the nobles governed by the Statutes from the fourteenth century: Timbal, 
Un Conflit…, p. 131-72. I am preparing a critical edition of the Statutes for a future monograph; printed 
transcriptions exist in HGL, 8: 625-35 and Timbal, Un Conflit…, p. 177-84. Henceforth, the Statutes will be 
referenced by SP, followed by the clause number (a modern innovation, misapplied in HGL, 8: 633-34, where xlv 
is repeated) in Roman numerals. 
5 M. Raguin-Barthelmebs, « Simon de Montfort et le gouvernement. Statut des femmes dans les Statuts de 
Pamiers (art. 46) avant la Magna Carta », Medieval Feminist Forum, 53, 2017, p. 38-90. However, according to 
her own adopted definition of colonisation (p. 59-61) the Statutes make an awkward fit. It is unclear how the 
exploitation of the crusaders’ conquests qualitatively differed from that of those noblemen they replaced. Even 
less evident is the métropole which putatively benefitted from this colonisation, as in 1212 France — strictly 
speaking, the territory around Paris — did not profit from or exercise any power over the conquests, and the 
attitude of King Philip II Augustus toward the Albigensian Crusade could be most generously described as 
« indifferent ». 
6 J. C. Holt, Magna Carta, 3rd edn, Cambridge, 2015, p. 235. 
7 S. Reynolds, « Magna Carta in its European Context », History, 101, 2016, p. 664. 
8 SP, xii, xliii, Appendix 1. 
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the laws of the kingdom as they had existed before the loss of the Holy City in 1187. The 
resulting work is a collection of customs in Levantine French which detail, among other things, 
how fiefs should descend in a wide variety of circumstances: at its most simple, the practice 
was male primogeniture. The same is true for the Assizes of Antioch, composed before 1219 
amid the hazy circumstances of the War of Antiochene Succession between Prince 
Bohemond IV and King Raymond-Ruben of Lesser Armenia. 9  Superficial comparisons 
between the Livre au roi and other legal texts of the kingdom of Jerusalem, collectively if 
anachronistically known as the Assizes of Jerusalem, and the Statutes of Pamiers have often 
been suggested by historians, who see in them a common colonising purpose.10 But they are in 
fact part of a much greater tradition of early thirteenth-century customs. In July 1200, as he 
prepared to set out for the Fourth Crusade, Count Baldwin VI of Hainaut (better known as IX 
of Flanders) laid down the rules governing inheritance in that county — again, based on male 
primogeniture.11 Both Aimery and Baldwin were more specific and comprehensive than Simon, 
with the result that their provisions were distinctly more complicated than those vaguely 
indicated in the Statutes. However, all three were enshrining principles that would both avoid 
intrafamilial conflict and ensure fiefs that could provide reliable military service: it is significant 
that both the Statutes and Baldwin’s so-called « Feudal Charter » make a point of restricting 
alienation that would prejudice the rights of overlords.12 By 1222, even Hungary, on the borders 
of Latin Christendom, had adopted male primogeniture: the Golden Bull of that year, issued by 
King Andrew II amidst a political crisis and accusations of bad government, assumes the 
practice as normal while still allowing limited elective testaments in default of sons.13 Such 
procedures and safeguards were crucial in territories where warfare was endemic. The point 
may seem obvious for the Midi, Outremer and Hungary, but Hainaut was also frequently subject 
to internecine violence among its fractious nobles.14 The customs may have been novel — as 
                                                          
9 Le Livre au roi, ed. M. Greilsammer, Paris, 1995, p. 231-35, 238-40, 242-44, 282; Assises d’Antioche, ed. 
and trans. L. M. Alishan, Venice, 1876, p. 18-20; P. W. Edbury, « The Assises d’Antioche. Law and Custom in the 
Principality of Antioch », Norman Expansion. Connections, Continuities and Contrasts, dir. K. J. Stringer, 
A. Jotischky, Farnham, 2013, p. 244-45. However, in both Jerusalem and Antioch, surviving younger sons and 
even daughters inherited in preference to grandsons: ibid., p. 244. 
10 P. Belperron, La Croisade contre les albigeois et l’union du Languedoc à la France, 1209-1249, Paris, 
1942, p. 244; Timbal, Un Conflit…, p. 174-75; J. Ventura, Pere el Catòlic i Simó de Montfort, Barcelona, 1960, 
p. 183; Y. Dossat, « Simon de Montfort », Cahiers de Fanjeaux, 4, 1969, p. 290; Roquebert, L’Épopée…, 1: 498; 
idem, Simon de Montfort. Bourreau et martyr, Paris, 2005, p. 272; L. W. Marvin, The Occitan War. A Military 
and Political History of the Albigensian Crusade, 1209-1218, Cambridge, 2008, p. 160. 
11 Coutumes du pays et comté de Hainaut, ed. C. Faider, Brussels, 1871-1883, 1: 3-5. There were important 
differences, particularly relating to the succession of children or siblings of an eldest heir: Le Livre au roi, p. 235; 
Coutumes du pays…, 1: 4. 
12 Coutumes…, 1: 5; SP, xli. The same concern about the interests of overlords appears in the constitution 
granted to the imperial princes by King Henry (VII) of the Romans in 1231 and confirmed by his father, Emperor 
Frederick II, in 1232: MGH Const., 2: 212, 419. In an interesting and related reversal — if unsurprising given their 
different contexts — these German constitutions forbid the construction of new imperial castles to the detriment 
of the princes, while the Statutes prohibit new fortifications without comital approval, and Frederick’s own 1220 
assizes for the kingdom of Sicily order the surrender and destruction of castles built since the death of King 
William II the Good in 1189: ibid.; SP, xxiii; Richard of San Germano, Chronica, ed. C. A. Garufi, Bologna, 1937-
1938, p. 92. Though exhibiting similar provisions, the first clearly aim at decentralisation, the latter two at a strong 
central authority. 
13 The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, ed. J. M. Bak, G. Bónis, J. R. Sweeney, Bakersfield, 
Calif., 1989-1992, 1: 34; M. Rady, Customary Law in Hungary. Courts, Texts, and the Tripartitum, Oxford, 2015, 
p. 78-79, 86-87. 
14 R. L. Wolff, « Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut, First Latin Emperor of Constantinople. His Life, Death, 
and Resurrection, 1172-1225 », Speculum, 27, 1952, p. 283. A corollary to the codification of inheritance is the 
Statutes’ specification that dowries should pass to children, not revert to the mother’s family: SP, xliv; cf. Layettes, 
1: 261, 277. This policy is echoed in the Assizes of Antioch and is implied in the Livre au roi, where a former 
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in the case of the Statutes — or traditional — as was probably true of the Feudal Charter — but 
their inscription was intended to resolve potential conflict within and prepare for potential 
threats from without. 
Such precautions meant little if knights did not properly perform their service. Naturally, 
knights could not be compelled to serve beyond the limits of their obligation. If his own person 
or lands were not in question, Simon excused his French barons and knights from joining him 
on campaign unless they did so ex amore et beneplacito suo.15 Aimery of Jerusalem made a 
similar exemption for his knights, as did Simon’s cousin, Ranulf III, sixth earl of Chester, in 
the charter he issued for his county amidst the First English Barons’ War in 1215.16 In the wake 
of his abortive campaign to Poitou in 1213 and its disastrous sequel in 1214 — both of which 
had been intended to restrain Simon and the Albigensian Crusade — King John of England 
came under pressure to grant his barons the right to remain at home during royal campaigns 
outside of England, Normandy and Brittany. This concession would not finally appear in Magna 
Carta. Instead, the king recognised that knights could not be compelled to render service in 
excess of that owed by their fiefs.17 Like primogeniture, the principle was not restricted to the 
Francophone world: the Golden Bull also exempts royal sergeants from unpaid service outside 
Hungary.18 The promise not to command service beyond frontiers was a commonplace; its 
inclusion among such liberties was an easy one, though no less valuable to those who had 
pledged their swords. 
But the Statutes do require Simon’s barons, summoned to military service in defence of 
his person or his conquests, to muster within fifteen days with the requisite number of knights, 
under pain of confiscation of their moveables. Latecomers and those without a full complement 
of knights could expect substantial financial penalties.19 Similarly, the Livre au roi docks the 
pay of knights who mustered with improper harness or unsuitable mount; those who proved 
incorrigible were then turned over to the marshal.20 Ranulf of Chester likewise required his 
barons to turn up with their agreed complements, properly equipped, in the Cheshire Charter.21 
The Assizes of Capua, issued in 1220 upon King Frederick I’s return to his kingdom of Sicily 
following his imperial coronation, proclaim his reinvigorated authority by insisting that all 
fiefholders be prepared to answer a royal summons with their expected service, on pain of 
                                                          
ward of the king, upon entering into his inheritance, may return to his mother a dowry confiscated by the Crown, 
as the property is now within his gift: Assises d’Antioche, p. 18; Le Livre au roi, p. 226. In England, where the 
centralised royal administration more effectively restrained internecine struggles and more efficiently enforced 
military service, the rebel barons of 1215 instead laid emphasis upon the widow’s rights to her dower: Holt, Magna 
Carta, p. 352, 360, 380, 422. Cf. R. H. Helmholz, « Magna Carta and the ius commune », The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 66, 1999, p. 316. 
15 SP, xvii (« out of their love and pleasure »). 
16  Le Livre au roi, p. 217; The Charters of the Anglo-Norman Earls of Chester, c. 1071-1237, ed. 
G. Barraclough, Stroud, 1988, p. 390; G. J. White, The Magna Carta of Cheshire, Chester, 2015, p. 76-77. For 
more on the obscure context of this « Cheshire Charter », see J. W. Alexander, Ranulf of Chester. A Relic of the 
Conquest, Athens, Ga, 1983, p. 63-64; G. J. White, « The Cheshire Magna Carta. Distinctive or Derivative? », 
Historical Research, 91, 2018, p. 187-92, 194-96. 
17 N. Vincent, « England and the Albigensian Crusade », England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III 
(1216-1272), dir. B. K. U. Weiler, I. W. Rowlands, Aldershot, 2002, p. 74-76; G. E. M. Lippiatt, Simon V of 
Montfort and Baronial Government, 1195-1218, Oxford, 2017, p. 42-43, 126-27; Holt, Magna Carta, p. 352, 360, 
384, 422. In the Assizes of Capua, Frederick of Sicily likewise forbad demands for military service in excess of 
those in force during the reign of his ancestor, William the Good: Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 91. 
18 The Laws…, 1: 35, 39. For servientes regis in Hungary, see Rady, Customary Law…, p. 70. 
19 SP, xvii, xxi-xxii. The customs of Saint-Gaudens and Montpellier likewise require host et cavalgada from 
their townsmen, though with similar restrictions to those above: La Grande Charte de Saint-Gaudens, ed. and 
trans. S. Mondon, Paris, 1910, p. 16; Layettes, 1: 262. 
20 Le Livre au roi, p. 163-64. 
21 The Charters…, p. 389. 
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losing their fief.22 Even when they were not required for a campaign, it was important to keep 
one’s fighting force readily available. Simon therefore forbad his knights from tarrying in 
France (as opposed to the Midi) for longer than their agreed leave, on pain of forfeiture of their 
lands.23 In the principality of Antioch, knights absent without leave could only be dispossessed 
for a year and a day, but in the kingdom of Jerusalem those knights who vacated their fiefs for 
a year and a day would face perpetual confiscation.24 Military effectiveness was crucial to such 
ruling minorities beset by frequent warfare and unreliable subjects. 
 It is unsurprising, given the similar pressures faced by the Montfortine Midi and 
Frankish Outremer, to find the same concerns expressed in the Statutes and the Livre au roi. 
That does not mean that they always came to the same conclusions. Though he compelled them 
to go into exile, Simon allowed the Catholic wives of proditores et hostes comitis to retain the 
possession and rents of their dowries, so long as they swore that they would not benefit their 
husbands while they remained at war contra christianitatem et comitem. 25  Nowhere is it 
suggested that the lady’s marriage might be dissolved on account of her husband’s « rebellion » 
or possible heresy; indeed, her exile is a direct result of a continuing nuptial tie. In the kingdom 
of Jerusalem, orthodox wives of condemned heretics or the wives of knights who had gone over 
to the Saracens for a year and a day were likewise entitled to the usufruct of their dowries (or 
of half their fiefs if they were the fief-holders themselves). However, in a blatant contravention 
of scriptural and ecclesiastical teaching on marriage, after a year and a day of a renegade 
knight’s apostasy, his marriage to a fief-holding lady was considered dissolved, freeing her for 
remarriage.26 For all that this chapter of the Livre au roi might benefit the military requirements 
of the kingdom by allowing a new knight to maintain the service of the lady’s fief, it flew in 
the face of the canonists’ — or for that matter, Christ’s — understanding of marriage. 
In other respects, however, the desire of the kings of Jerusalem to provide for the 
marriages of important heiresses was hardly unique. The interest of a lord — especially the 
Crown — in the provision of a suitable knight to govern a fief through marriage was universally 
recognised, and usually led to rights over the choice of husband. In the kingdom of Sicily, 
counts and barons could not be married without royal licence, a restriction reaffirmed by 
Frederick in the Assizes of Capua.27 Reformed customs more frequently tended to limit such 
rights. Magna Carta and the Cheshire Charter commit the king and the earl respectively not to 
                                                          
22 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 93. 
23 SP, xix. 
24 Assises d’Antioche, p. 12; Le Livre au roi, p. 200. 
25 SP, xlv. In 1216, Simon required papal prodding to pay 150m. to the countess of Toulouse, Eleanor of 
Aragon, from her dowry at Beaucaire after the deposition of her husband: RHGF, 19: 606; G. E. M. Lippiatt, « Un 
symbole contesté. Beaucaire, la croisade albigeoise et le quatrième concile du Latran », 1216, le siège de 
Beaucaire. Pouvoir, société et culture dans le Midi rhodanien (seconde moitié du XIIe-première moitié du XIIIe 
siècle, dir. M. Bourin, Beaucaire, 2019, p. 265-66. For later attitudes toward the dowries of the loyal and orthodox 
wives of outlawed or heretical husbands, see A. W. Jones, Before Church and State. A Study of Social Order in 
the Sacramental Kingdom of St Louis IX, Steubenville, Ohio, 2017, p. 134-35. 
26  Matthew 5.32, 19.9; Mark 10.11-12; Luke 16.18; D. L. d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities. 
A Weberian Analysis, Cambridge, 2010, p. 19-20; idem, Papacy, Monarchy and Marriage, 860-1600, Cambridge, 
2015, p. 208-09; Le Livre au roi, p. 196-97, 203-04. Cf. J. A. Brundage, « Marriage Law in the Latin Kingdom of 
Jerusalem », Outremer. Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem, dir. B. Z. Kedar, H. E. 
Mayer, R. C. Smail, Jerusalem, 1982, p. 266-67; idem, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, 
Chicago, 1987, p. 201, 292-94. The provision for ending a marriage on the grounds of unbelief might be justified 
in light of I Corinthians 7.15, but Gratian specifies in his Decretum (C. 28, q. 2, c. 2) that the ability to remarry in 
these circumstances applies only to those who married as pagans and later converted to Christianity, not to the 
abandoned spouse of a baptised apostate; he was followed by Pope Innocent III, who expanded the question to 
treat heresy specifically: Register, 2: 88-89. 
27  Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 92. The prerogative would be enshrined once more in the 
Constitutions of Melfi in 1231: MGH Const., 2 Suppl.: 388. 
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disparage heiresses; in other words, not to treat them as rewards for the service of a lord’s 
socially inferior creatures. The king also promised not to force fief-holding widows to marry, 
though he retained rights over the choice of groom should they wish to do so.28 The Livre au 
roi allows a year and a day of mourning for the late husbands of fief-holding widows; after this 
period, the lady might be made to marry one of the three choices presented to her by her lord 
or face confiscation of her lands. On the other hand, should she marry without seigneurial 
permission, she might be disseised by the king.29 These qualifications betray an increasing, if 
still imperfect, reflection of canonical insistence on the consent of the partners to the validity 
of a marriage.30 Their association with « colonialism » notwithstanding, Simon’s Statutes go 
much further in conforming to decretal theory and limiting nuptial oversight. « Magnate » 
widows and heiresses possessing fortifications are forbidden from marrying southern husbands 
without comital licence for a period of ten years, but are able to marry French lords freely within 
that time and as they choose afterwards.31 This clause has been seen by some historians as an 
attempt to « breed out » the southern nobility, and no doubt it was designed to exclude faidits, 
whether actual or potential, from political and social life and thus deprive them of 
descendants.32 In the context of other customs, however, Simon’s policy appears relatively 
permissive: the licence was no longer required in all cases, as was usual, and in time, would be 
phased out altogether.33 In the meantime, of course, the statute benefitted the establishment of 
the crusader lords. As the lordly prerogative over marriages became increasingly circumscribed 
throughout Latin Christendom, Simon proposed to discontinue it, but, paradoxically, in such a 
way as to solidify his rule in a hostile land. 
Concerns about sex were not reducible to inheritance. Simon and his wife, Alice, like 
Baldwin of Flanders — a fellow Fourth Crusader — and his wife, Mary of Champagne, appear 
to have maintained a chaste marriage. But neither Baldwin nor Simon confined their observance 
of sexual morality to their own beds: as eastern Roman emperor, Baldwin forbad his nobles to 
stay the night in his palace in the company of any woman other than their own wives, while 
Simon, anticipating the following year’s council of Paris, ordered all prostitutes to be expelled 
without town walls.34 Half a year after the Assizes of Capua, Frederick of Sicily issued the 
                                                          
28 Holt, Magna Carta, p. 352, 360, 362, 380-82, 422; The Charters…, p. 389; White, « The Cheshire Magna 
Carta… », p. 193. 
29 Le Livre au roi, p. 219-22, 223, 225. Cf. Philip of Novara, Le livre de forme de plait, ed. P. W. Edbury, 
Nicosia, 2009, p. 290-91 n. 265. 
30 Helmholz, « Magna Carta… », p. 316-17; D. L. d’Avray, Medieval Marriage. Symbolism and Society, 
Oxford, 2005, p. 124-29, 184. 
31 SP, xlvi. In 1204, King Peter II of Aragon and Mary of Montpellier completely abandoned seigneurial 
rights over the marriages of Montepessulan townswomen, as did Viscount Raymond-Roger Trencavel of 
Carcassonne over the women of that city: Layettes, 1: 262, 278. After the deposition and death of Trencavel in 
1209, Simon became Peter’s man for the viscounty in 1211 and would administer Montpellier in trust for Peter’s 
son, James, from that year until the collapse of relations between king and viscount in early 1213: Lippiatt, Simon V 
of Montfort…, p. 28-29, 47. 
32  J. Girou, Simon de Montfort, Paris, 1953, p. 131; Ventura, Pere el Catòlic…, p. 184; Roquebert, 
L’Épopée…, 1: 504; idem, Simon de Montfort…, p. 272-73; M. G. Pegg, A Most Holy War. The Albigensian 
Crusade and the Battle for Christendom, Oxford, 2008, p. 122; Raguin-Barthelmebs, « Simon de Montfort… », 
p. 64, 77, 85, 89-90. 
33 This is noted obliquely and in passing by Carpenter, Magna Carta, p. 273. Raguin-Barthelmebs, « Simon 
de Montfort… », p. 77-78 rightly notes that Carpenter finds the « positive » interpretation of this clause by reading 
between the lines, rather than according to its obvious intention. However, she does not fully acknowledge the 
significance of the abolition of marriage licences from superior lords, despite her analysis on p. 84-86. No doubt, 
as she argues, this clause contains a clever bit of rhetoric; nevertheless, it marked a significant liberalisation of 
existing marriage restrictions (save in Montpellier and Carcassonne), which would have become all the more 
radical upon the expiry of the ten-year period. 
34 G. E. M. Lippiatt, « Simon de Montfort, les cisterciens et les écoles. Le contexte intellectuel d’un seigneur 
croisé », Cahiers de civilisation médiévale, 61, 2018, p. 278-79; MGH SS, 21: 550-51; Nicetas Choniates, 
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further Assizes of Messina, which also required prostitutes to remove their trade from within 
city walls, as well as to wear a cloak in a masculine style and restrict their attendance at baths 
to Wednesdays.35 Though its concerns seem to have been more feudal, the Livre au roi went so 
far as to prescribe disinheritance for any heiress who should lose her virginity through 
fornication.36 Interest in sexual purity was not the exclusive preserve of the clergy. 
The persecution of heresy, the raison d’être of the Albigensian Crusade and therefore 
the Statutes of Pamiers, also reveals lay approaches to realising the Christian republic. Simon 
ordered the destruction of heretical « convents » and their replacement with churches and 
presbyteries, the dispossession of those found to have harboured heretics, the barring of 
heretical believers — even if reconciled — from public functions, the expulsion of reconciled 
heretics from the towns in which they had ministered and the compulsion of former heretical 
believers to strict military service. 37  Many of these provisions echo earlier papal 
pronouncements against heretics. In 1184, in partnership with Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, 
Pope Lucius III had issued the bull Ad abolendam, which forbad the appointment of supporters 
of heretics to public office and imposed confiscation on relapsed heretics themselves. 38 
Thirteen years before the Statutes of Pamiers, Pope Innocent III repeated these penalties in 
Vergentis in senium, as well as extending confiscations in papal lands to those who received or 
defended heretics and disinheriting their orthodox children.39 Simon was therefore reiterating 
papal policy in the Statutes while also adapting it to the particular realities of the Midi, where 
heretics formed a respected element of society. 
Beyond confiscation for believers in heretics, punishment was left intentionally vague. 
Ad abolendam had decreed relaxation to secular justice for those convicted of heresy, while 
Vergentis in senium urged princes to follow Innocent’s example in expanding the penalty for 
confiscation. Given canonical aversion to iudicia sanguinis, the Church could not impose the 
                                                          
Historia, ed. J.-L. van Dieten, Berlin, 1975, 1: 597; SP, xxxix; Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima 
collectio, ed. G. D. Mansi et al., Florence and Venice, 1758-1798, 22: 854. The consuls of Toulouse and 
Carcassonne had already expelled prostitutes from their cities earlier in the century: HGL, 8: 472; Layettes, 1: 281. 
35 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 97; W. Stürner, Friedrich II., Darmstadt, 1992-2000, 2: 12-13. 
36 Le Livre au roi, p. 228-30; J. Prawer, Crusader Institutions, Oxford, 1980, p. 459-60. An extramarital loss 
of virginity reflects the same penalties as a marriage without seigneurial licence, as they share the same feudal 
result of jeopardising the lord’s ability to command service from the fief: Le Livre au roi, p. 223, 227; cf. Philip 
of Novara, Le livre de forme…, p. 161-62. 
37 SP, x-xi, xiv-xv, xxiv. The pre-crusade customs of Carcassonne, perhaps at the urging of Peter of Aragon, 
had already banned heretics from remaining in omni terra et posse domini Carcassone: Layettes, 1: 279. Though 
not concerned with heresy, Baldwin of Hainaut’s requirements that his subjects forswear friends and neighbours 
convicted of murder or be associated in their punishment shares commonalities with Simon’s penalties for those 
who aid or abet heretics or other hostes christi. Simon’s exclusion of heretics from his lands also finds parallels in 
the proscription of convicts by Baldwin, Emperor Frederick II, and King Henry (VII) of the Romans from the 
protection of cities, towns, lords or other men: SP, xi, xxxvi-xxxvii; Coutumes…, 1: 7-8; Richard of San Germano, 
Chronica, p. 89; MGH Const., 2: 212, 419. 
38 Corpus iuris canonici, ed. E. Friedberg, 2nd edn, Leipzig, 1879-1881, 2: 780-81. The phrase ad abolendam 
hereticorum pravitatem, almost exactly mirroring the incipit of Lucius’ bull, appears in the preamble to the Statutes 
of Pamiers: SP, Preamble; Corpus iuris…, 2: 780. 
39 Register, 2: 4-5. Cf. MGH Const., 2: 108-09. For the controversy over Vergentis in senium among the 
canonists and Innocent’s own second thoughts, see K. Pennington, « ‘Pro peccatis patrum puniri’. A Moral and 
Legal Problem of the Inquisition », Church History, 47, 1978, p. 137-54; O. Hageneder, « Studien zur 
Dekretale Vergentis (X V.7.10). Ein Beitrag zur Häretikergesetzgebung Innocenz III. », Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, 49, 1963, p. 150, 158-60, 163-66; M. Meschini, « L’Evoluzione della normativa 
antiereticale di Innocenzo III dalla Vergentis in senium (1199) al IV concilio lateranense (1215) », Bullettino 
dell’Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 106, 2004, p. 207-31; idem, « Innocent III, the Fourth Lateran 
Council and the Albigensian Crusade », The Fourth Lateran Council and the Crusade Movement, dir. J. L. Bird, 
D. J. Smith, Turnhout, 2018, p. 125-28 (though the last may be too receptive to the propagandistic portrayal of the 
pope in the Canso). 
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death penalty, however much she knew that it lay behind her recommendation that heretics be 
given pro qualitate facinoris ultio.40 Nor did Simon define a penalty in the Statutes for those 
handed over to his authority for punishment, though the experience of his campaigns shows his 
preference for death by burning.41 Fifteen years earlier, in the neighbouring Crown of Aragon, 
King Peter II — who would become Simon’s reluctant overlord for the viscounties of Béziers 
and Carcassonne — had ordered all heretics expelled from his lands; those discovered after 
Passion Sunday (15 March) 1198 would have their goods confiscated and their bodies 
committed to the flames.42 On the other side of the Mediterranean, the kingdom of Jerusalem 
had likewise, since the third quarter of the twelfth century, explicitly codified the stake as the 
punishment for heresy — significantly, not the « classical » heresies observed among local 
Christians, but rather the same dualist, patelin creed that so terrified the contemporary West.43 
Catholic Christendom, from France to Palestine, had moved beyond the controversies of the 
great oecumenical councils, concentrating her quite literal fire on the neomanichees suspected 
of undermining Latin society. 
Judging heretics, however, remained a tricky prospect for a number of reasons. Chief 
among these was the absence of firm evidence should the accused choose to dissemble. A near 
universal means of supplying proof when it was lacking — especially, but not exclusively, in 
cases of heresy — was the ordeal. This was an appeal to divine intervention through the healing 
of burns, the immersion of water, or the decision of combat. However, in the face of vehement 
condemnation by elements of the « neogregorian » Church as superstitious and unreliable, the 
former two « unilateral » ordeals would largely disappear following canonical proscription at 
the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.44 Three years earlier, in the appendix to the Statutes of 
Pamiers agreed by Simon of Montfort with his French barons, the crusader had forbidden 
duellum — trial by battle, the ordeal most hated by clerical reformers — in all seigneurial 
courts. This prohibition, however, seems to lack the force of its convictions, making allowances 
for trial by battle in most capital cases, such as treason, theft, rape and murder.45 Perhaps the 
                                                          
40 Corpus iuris…, 1: 179-80, 964, 2: 781 (« retribution according to the nature of the crime »); Register, 2: 
5; cf. J. W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle, 
Princeton, 1970, 1: 320-21. 
41 CCA, 1: 116-18, 164, 172; PVC, 1: 118, 161, 228, 233; GP, p. 70. 
42 PCD, 1: 266-67. 
43 Le Livre au roi, p. 196-97; Prawer, Crusader Institutions, p. 461-62. This distinction is clear from the 
invitation of the Latin Patriarch Aimery of Antioch to his Jacobite counterpart, Michael the Great, to accompany 
him to the Third Lateran Council in 1179. Michael did not ultimately make the journey, but he did write an 
extensive (now lost) refutation of dualist heresy as he had been given to understand it: Michael the Great, 
Chronique, trans. J.-B. Chabot, Paris, 1899-1905, 3: 377-78. For conceptual connections between the albigenses 
of the Midi, the patelin of the Livre au roi and the popelican encountered by the Fourth Crusaders at Philippopolis, 
see G. E. M. Lippiatt, « Bogomils or Bogeymen?. Heresy in the Thirteenth-Century French Mediterranean », 
forthcoming. 
44 R. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water. The Medieval Judicial Ordeal, Oxford, 1986, p. 20-24, 52-53, 57, 79-
81, 84-88, 97-99; J. W. Baldwin, « The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals », 
Speculum, 36, 1961, p. 613-36; Conciliorum oecumenicorum generaliumque decreta, ed. G. Alberigo, A. Melloni, 
Turnhout, 2006-2013, 2: 177. For the neologism « neogregorian », see Lippiatt, « Simon de Montfort… », p. 269. 
The kingdom of Jerusalem had embraced the hot iron for suspected adulterers since 1120, and it remained through 
the thirteenth century the test for those accused of homicide without witnesses in the Court of Burghers: B. Z. 
Kedar, « On the Origins of the Earliest Laws of Frankish Jerusalem. The Canons of the Council of Nablus, 1120 », 
Speculum, 74, 1999, p. 333; Les Livres des assises et des usages dou reaume de Jerusalem, ed. E. H. Kausler, 
Stuttgart, 1839, 1: 340. In Hungary, there is isolated evidence of the survival of the ordeal by fire until at least 
1234: Bartlett, Trial by Fire…, p. 128-30. 
45 SP, Appendix 2; Bartlett, Trial by Fire…, p. 117-18. In the Midi, as recently as 1202, the ordeal — under 
the forms of hot iron or boiling water — had been enshrined as the means of appeal from a conviction for theft or 
alia maleffacta in the customs of Fendeille in the Lauragais, while trial by battle was admitted in the comital court 
of Comminges in 1203: J. Ramière de Fortanier, Chartes de franchises du Lauragais, Toul, 1939, p. 445; La 
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intention was to provide a public deterrent from such heinous crimes, as Frederick of Sicily 
would explain when making a similar prohibition with similar exceptions in the Constitutions 
of Melfi of 1231; no doubt the clause appended to the Statutes was also a result of negotiation 
between Simon and his followers, who wished to maintain their judicial rights.46 The situation 
in England was similarly vague: no mention was made of the ordeal in Magna Carta, but the 
Charter’s liberalisation of the writ of inquisition of life or limbs meant that anyone accused of 
a crime meriting death or dismemberment could insist on a jury trial instead. Nevertheless, 
despite the abolition of the ordeals of fire and water in 1219, trial by battle long survived in 
England and in the rest of Latin Christendom.47 Indeed, the Statutes are remarkable for their 
attempt to restrict the duellum, which appears as normal practice in the Livre au roi, the Assizes 
of Antioch, and the Golden Bull. Even King Louis IX of France, forbidding trial by battle in 
his demesne in 1258, would allow it to persist in la court a ses barons.48 More pertinent for 
cases of heresy was Simon’s insistence on the testimony of bishops or priests for such 
convictions: no mention is made of the ordeal, but this restriction to clerical jurisdiction — 
particularly given neogregorian opposition to such peregrina iudicia — all but ensured its 
exclusion in favour of inquisition.49 For all their equivocation and implication, the Statutes 
provide one of the earliest attempts by temporal power to curtail trial by battle and separate 
judgements of heresy from the ordeal. 
A second problem in judging heretics was their accurate identification. In Outremer, 
perhaps because of the scarcity of dualist heresy, such recognition was assumed to be self-
evident. A heretic in the kingdom of Jerusalem was condemned on his confession or the 
testimony of his neighbours or former heretical companions, turned King’s evidence; in other 
words, by denunciation before temporal courts. 50  Again, the Statutes’ emphasis on 
ecclesiastical competence in such cases presents a contrast. Not only did this neogregorian 
reorientation implicitly discourage the ordeal, it also asserted clerical rights in defining and 
discovering heresy, preventing the charge — in theory — from becoming a tool for temporal 
ends.51 Perhaps surprisingly, given the place of the First Crusade in the Gregorian programme, 
Outremer was consistently out of step with the ecclesiastical prerogatives represented in the 
                                                          
Grande Charte…, p. 24-26. In Montpellier, clerical interest led to a restriction of the ordeal by 1204, an initiative 
imitated in pre-crusade Carcassonne, though without reference to ecclesiastical pressure: Layettes, 1: 261, 277. In 
1211, Simon’s own court had offered trial by battle to a knight charged with treason; when he refused, his lord, 
the Frenchman Guy of Lucy, had him hanged: PVC, 1: 251. 
46 MGH Const., 2 Suppl.: 338-41; Bartlett, Trial by Fire…, p. 123-25. It does not seem to have been, contra 
Lippiatt, Simon V of Montfort…, p. 96 and idem, « Simon de Montfort… », p. 280, an attempt to guard aristocratic 
privilege, as trial by battle was not yet exclusive to chivalry: Bartlett, Trial by Fire…, p. 110, 125. 
47 Holt, Magna Carta, p. 364, 388, 425; Carpenter, Magna Carta, p. 181; Patent Rolls of the Reign of 
Henry III, London, 1901-1903, 1: 186; Bartlett, Trial by Fire…, p. 122-23. 
48 Le Livre au roi, p. 152, 193-94, 206, 254; Assises d’Antioche, p. 26, 32, 34; The Laws…, 1: 35, 40; Les 
Établissements de Saint Louis, ed. P. Viollet, Paris, 1881, 1: 487-93; J. Tardif, « La Date et la caractère de 
l’ordonnance de Saint Louis sur le duel judiciare », Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger, 11, 
1887, p. 169-70; Philip of Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. A. Salmon, Paris, 1899-1900, 2: 379. 
Attempts had been made to exclude trial by battle among the Lombards in the kingdom of Sicily as early as 1171: 
C. Pellegrino, Historia principum langobardorum, Naples, 1643-1644, 1: 258; cf. G. Petroni, Della Storia di Bari, 
Naples, 1857-1860, 2: 442. 
49 SP, xxv; R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society. Authority and Deviance in Western Europe, 
950-1250, 2nd edn, Oxford, 2007, p. 124-25. Moore, however, overstates the « communal » nature of the verdict 
by ordeal: cf. Bartlett, Trial by Fire…, p. 36-42, 101-02. 
50 Le Livre au roi, p. 195-96. 
51  SP, xxv. Cf. the councils of Avignon (1209), Montpellier (1215) and Toulouse (1229): Sacrorum 
conciliorum…, 22: 785, 950, 23: 195 and Emperor Frederick II’s Constitution of San Pietro in Vaticano (1220): 
MGH Const., 2: 108. The adaptation of Vergentis in senium in the third canon (Excommunicamus) of the Fourth 
Lateran Council likewise seeks to bring confiscation penalties for heresy under episcopal and papal oversight: 
Conciliorum oecumenicorum…, 2: 167; Hageneder, « Studien zur Dekretale… », p. 165. 
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Statutes. The Church in the Holy Land was slow to adopt Gregorian practices and only ever 
showed limited enthusiasm for neogregorian ideas, in part because she was rarely supplied with 
clergy from the schools.52 Though heresy was clearly a concern for the ruling aristocracy in 
both the Montfortine Midi and Outremer, their methods for addressing it represented the great 
shift in perceptions of the Church’s role in good governance. 
Nevertheless, an emphasis on the importance of proof — however understood — and 
process in judgement was common to all the customs codified in the early thirteenth century. 
When Simon of Montfort repeatedly stressed throughout the Statutes that judgements should 
rest on the accused being confessus, conuictus, or comprobatus, he was not articulating a 
doctrine previously alien to the Midi: local precursors demonstrate similar concerns.53 Instead, 
he was reassuring his subjects that his customs would be enforced with justice, not abused 
through arbitrary will. The Livre au roi similarly grounds its customs in an objective source 
external to royal or seigneurial will by justifying its procedures and penalties with the refrain 
of la raison juge et comande, while the so-called « Penal Charter » — issued by Baldwin of 
Hainaut at the same time as the Feudal Charter discussed above — concludes with the provision 
that hec omnia per bonam veritatem comprobanda sunt.54 The Assizes of Capua require that 
royal justiciars swear an oath to deliver justice to all swiftly and without deceit.55 The Golden 
Bull insists that royal sergeants are not to be imprisoned or ruined nisi prius citati fuerint et 
ordine iudicario convicti.56 With the possible exception of the last example, these are as much 
background acknowledgements as explicitly stated priorities. As such, and like so much else 
discussed here, the emphasis on impartial justice was nothing new, but rather an easy 
concession of a recognised principle. 
What makes these aspirational commonplaces worthy of the ink and parchment to 
record them is the introduction of procedures for how they might be attained. Outside of the 
detailed Livre au roi, these mechanisms of criminal justice are rarely elaborated, suggesting 
that they remained largely assumed.57 The Statutes forbid private vengeance, reserving redress 
                                                          
52 H. E. Mayer, Geschichte der Kreuzzüge, new edn, Stuttgart, 2005, p. 210-11; idem, « The Concordat of 
Nablus », Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 33, 1982, p. 541; M. Angold, « The Interaction of Latins and 
Byzantines during the Period of the Latin Empire (1204-1261). The Case of the Ordeal », Actes du XVe Congrès 
intérnational d’études byzantines, 4, 1980, p. 3; C. MacEvitt, The Crusades and the Christian World of the East. 
Rough Tolerance, Philadelphia, 2008, p. 19-20; B. Hamilton, The Latin Church in the Crusader States. The 
Secular Church, London, 1980, p. 134-36; C. Tyerman, God’s War. A New History of the Crusades, London, 
2006, p. 218, 235-36. Archbishop William II of Tyre and Bishop James of Acre (better known as James of Vitry) 
were notable exceptions: P. W. Edbury and J. G. Rowe, William of Tyre. Historian of the Latin East, Cambridge, 
1988, p. 15; J. Donnadieu, Jacques de Vitry (1175/1180-1240) entre l’Orient et l’Occident. L’Évêque aux trois 
visages, Turnhout, 2014, p. 83-121. 
53  SP, xi, xxi, xxvi, xxxiv-xxxvii. Customs in Limoux (1178), Pexioria (1194), Fendeille (1202) and 
Rabastens (1211) had prohibited the arbitrary capture of men within their borders, though murderers, traitors and 
thieves might still remain outlaws: A. Sabarthes, Les manuscrits consulaires de Limoux (Aude). Étude historique 
et philologique, Paris, 1930, p. 40; Ramière de Fortanier, Chartes de franchises…, p. 444, 534; E. Marty, 
« Cartulaire de Rabastens », Revue historique, scientifique et littéraire du département du Tarn, 18, 1901, p. 102. 
The Charter of Saint-Gaudens (1203) in Comminges shows intimate concern with judicial procedure: La Grande 
Charte…, p. 16-18, 20, 22-24, 32, 34, 36-38, 40, 46-50, 52-54. The customs of Montpellier and Carcassonne 
(1204) are likewise concerned with due process, and townsmen are entirely immune from detention without cause: 
Layettes, 1: 255-64, 272-81. Nevertheless, these customs preserve a right to vengeance, though requiring its 
exercise be registered with the court: ibid., p. 258, 259, 263, 275, 278-79. 
54 Le Livre au roi, passim; Coutumes du pays…, 1: 9 (« all these things will be proved according to good 
evidence »). 
55 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 89. 
56 The Laws…, 1: 34, 38-39 (« except they will first have been summoned and convicted by judicial order »). 
57 Magna Carta, with its references to various writs, is the exception that proves the rule: the writs themselves, 
even when made universal, are not themselves explicated but are taken for granted as part of the furniture of the 
centralised royal administration: e.g. Holt, Magna Carta, p. 388. 
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to superior jurisdiction, while guaranteeing rights to bail, a legal advocate and free judgement.58 
Baldwin’s charters of 1200 likewise restrict private conflict in the count’s absence by reference 
to the comital bailiff and the forswearing of blood feuds.59 Ranulf of Chester, while promising 
the liberty of his barons’ courts, reserved placita ad gladium meum — felony cases — to 
himself, ensured the right to bail by one’s lord and limited the power of his own sergeants to 
bring charges against his barons’ men in the comital court. He also upheld the local custom of 
thwertnic, whereby an immediate denial by the accused could preserve his liberty or at least 
transfer his case to his lord’s court.60 Between 1207 and 1209, Peter de Brus, a Yorkshire baron 
and future rebel in the First Barons’ War, promised his knights and freemen of Cleveland that 
he would only summon them to the Langbaurgh wapentake court according to the traditional 
consideratio of that court; the resultant charter was likely an implicit criticism of royal practice. 
In response, Magna Carta, like the Statutes two and a half years earlier, famously ensures free 
and immediate justice for all and, like the Cheshire Charter, restricts royal agents by preventing 
bailiffs from bringing charges without witnesses.61 In Sicily, Frederick excluded the possibility 
of personal justice, reserving all punishment to his own justiciars.62 Due process implies a 
regulated forum — a court — in which that process can take place. 
However, in the Statutes and most other early thirteenth-century legal texts, the 
elucidation of judicial process goes no further. Only the Livre au roi and the Assizes of Antioch 
articulate the mechanics of judgement. In the kingdom of Jerusalem, the esgart de ses pers was 
a public process by which the king should judge his liegeman: the accusation must be made in 
the presence of the accused and other liegemen assembled, who must then give a verdict.63 
Although « judgement by peers » was not a slogan in the principality of Antioch, the principle 
is nevertheless found in the Assizes’ prescription that a liegeman should be tried, after a strictly 
formulaic summons, by his fellow liegemen in the princely court.64 The developed procedure 
of Jerusalem is unsurprising, given that the kingdom was at this time one of the most centralised 
monarchies here under discussion. Princely authority was traditionally somewhat weaker in 
Antioch but nevertheless remained centripetal, especially in the wake of Saladin’s conquests of 
1188. Moreover, the principality’s judicial practices were likely influenced by its southern 
neighbour.65 Famously, Magna Carta did explicitly demand legale iuditium parium suorum, but 
                                                          
58 SP, xiii, xxviii, xxxiv. The customs of Montpellier and Carcassonne likewise require gratuitous justice: 
Layettes, 1: 255, 256, 257, 263, 272, 273. However, in Montpellier, a case would proceed even without an 
advocate: ibid., p. 262. 
59 Coutumes du pays…, 1: 5, 7-8. 
60 The Charters…, p. 389; White, The Magna Carta…, p. 35-36, 49; R. Stewart-Brown, « Thwert-ut-nay and 
the Custom of ‘Thwertnic’ in Cheshire », The English Historical Review, 40, 1925, p. 16-17. Cf. The Treatise on 
the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill, ed. G. D. G. Hall, Oxford, 1965, p. 19-
20, 171-72. 
61  Cartularium prioratus de Gyseburne, ed. W. Brown, Durham, 1889, 1: 93; H. M. Thomas, Vassals, 
Heiresses, Crusaders, and Thugs. The Gentry of Angevin Yorkshire, 1154-1216, Philadelphia, 1993, p. 204-06; 
Holt, Magna Carta, p. 364, 388, 425. Cf. Helmholz, « Magna Carta… », p. 339-42. 
62 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 89, 92. 
63 Le Livre au roi, p. 208-10. Cf. ibid., p. 190-91, 193, 201. Usama ibn Munqidh provides independent 
testimony of the inviolability of the judgement by peers in the twelfth-century kingdom of Jerusalem: Usama ibn 
Munqidh, The Book of Contemplation. Islam and the Crusades, trans. P. M. Cobb, London, 2008, p. 76-77. Since 
the time of King Baldwin II, the king could, in specifically enumerated cases, disinherit his liegemen without 
esgart de cort, but this was with respect to sentence rather than verdict: ibid., p. 177-84; J. Riley-Smith, « Further 
Thoughts on Baldwin II’s établissement on the Confiscation of Fiefs », Crusade and Settlement, dir. P. W. Edbury, 
Cardiff, 1985, p. 177-78. 
64 Assises d’Antioche, p. 12-16. 
65 S. Tibble, Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099-1291, Oxford, 1989; A. D. 
Buck, The Principality of Antioch and its Frontiers in the Twelfth Century, Woodbridge, 2017, p. 86-123; Edbury, 
« The Assises… », p. 246. 
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the structure of this judgement was not defined — save in the threat of distraint upon the king 
by the « security council » — perhaps because a sophisticated legal procedure could be taken 
for granted in England.66 Elsewhere, barons such as Simon of Montfort hint at the existence of 
process with guarantees, suggesting that, in their case at least, the distinction is one of capacity 
rather than will: Simon simply did not possess the financial or human resources to construct 
from scratch a legal infrastructure comparable to that of England and simultaneously ruled a 
territory far too large to govern as personally as did the kings of Jerusalem or princes of Antioch. 
As a result, the Statutes leave the essential details of judicial process frustratingly vague. 
Nevertheless, procedure comes more clearly into focus in the Statutes and elsewhere 
when considering their attitude toward the lower social classes. Both Magna Carta and the 
Cheshire Charter require the liberties granted by the king or earl to « trickle down » to the 
subjects of their beneficiaries.67 These beneficiaries appear to be defined quite broadly, at least 
at the linguistic level. Magna Carta benefits the liber homo, who might be a tenant, a lord or 
finally any member of society not bound to serfdom. The Statutes, by contrast, juxtapose homo 
in opposition to dominus in their protection of men from seizure on account of their lords’ debts. 
This contrast leads Holt to conclude that the Charter extends legal rights across society « in a 
characteristic and unique manner ».68 However, Prof. David Carpenter points out that Magna 
Carta’s careful exclusion of unfree serfs in fact left the overwhelming majority of the English 
population in the cold.69 The Statutes’ preservation of social hierarchy between « lords » and 
« men » paradoxically proves more inclusive, since the latter indiscriminately refers to free and 
unfree throughout the document. Unlike in Magna Carta, these homines are all protected from 
imprisonment so long as they can provide sureties that they will stand trial.70 Both documents 
extend their procedures to include those not party to their drafting, but only the Statutes make 
these guarantees — as well as restrictions — universal. 
The social distinctions in the Statutes emphasised by Holt have a further function, as 
indeed they have in Magna Carta. In clauses reminiscent of the apparent breadth of the Charter, 
the Statutes associate everyone in inheritance customs and peacekeeping prohibitions. But once 
again, rather than use a levelling term such as Magna Carta’s liber homo to refer to the whole, 
individual social classes are explicitly denominated: barons (barones), knights (milites), 
burghers (burgenses) and peasants (rustici/rurales).71 No doubt Holt is right to identify a 
concern to protect social distinctions in the tenor of the Statutes. But in relation to the penalties 
for those who break the peace or enter sworn confederations, they also establish a gradation of 
fines that protects the substance of those with fewer means, just as Magna Carta requires that 
amercements not infringe on the livelihood of the offender, whether he be a freeman, merchant 
                                                          
66 Holt, Magna Carta, p. 364, 370, 388, 392, 394-96, 424-25; Carpenter, Magna Carta, p. 180-81, 260-61. 
Cf. e.g. Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs, London, 1868-1871, 2: 89-91, 248-52; idem, alias Benedict 
of Peterborough, The Chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I, ed. W. Stubbs, London, 1867, 1: 108-10. 
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71 SP, xii, xxxiv-xxxv, xliii, Appendix 1. 
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or villein.72 An emphasis on hierarchy does not preclude — in fact, it may reinforce — an 
interest in the welfare of the lower orders. 
The two obviously did not always march together, as a comparison of the Statutes of 
Pamiers with other cognates makes clear. The Livre au roi implicitly preserves the ligesse par 
l’assise of King Amaury of Jerusalem, which flattened the noble hierarchy by making all the 
men of the king’s barons direct royal liegemen themselves in relation to the High Court.73 
However, it makes few provisions for anyone else, despite its claim to be le livre de tous les 
jugemens qui establirent les anciens roys, et de borgés et de chevaliers et de Suriens et de toutes 
autres leus. Some protections were extended to the urban classes. A burgher could only be 
convicted of striking a knight on the testimony of fellow burghers and could not be forced to 
pay a reparative fine before judgement, while a knight convicted — by knightly witnesses — 
of beating a burgher would lose his chivalric harness and beasts; if the burgher had been 
permanently maimed, the knight could be convicted by bourgeois witnesses under oath and lose 
his right hand as well. A knight accused of killing a burgher could flee the kingdom, suffering 
perpetual confiscation of his goods, or stand trial by battle. If defeated, he would be hanged and 
his property confiscated by the Crown. However, in such a trial, the victim’s family had to find 
a knightly champion to fight their cause; if he were defeated, he would suffer the same 
humiliating penalty, and the bourgeois family’s property and persons would be at the king’s 
mercy. Such attendant risks surely encouraged the bereaved to settle out of court.74 The Golden 
Bull makes hardly any mention of most freemen. Save for the order that tithes be paid in kind 
rather than silver and a passing wish that pauperes…non opprimantur nec spolientur by the 
itinerant royal household, it ignores the concerns of those below the rank of royal sergeant. 
Only the latter were defended from arbitrary royal seizure or destruction and the collection of 
freemen’s pence and other extraordinary taxes. All men were to be tried in the palatine court, 
but only nobles accused of charges leading to execution or confiscation could expect royal 
interest in their case. 75  Emperor Frederick II, by contrast, explicitly defended peasants 
throughout the Empire from assault or seizure.76 In Hainaut, the Penal Charter omits sanctions 
laid down by Baldwin’s father in 1171, which — similar to those in the Livre au roi — protected 
peasants from murder or injury by aristocrats. Presumably, this was a result of consultation 
between Baldwin and his nobles, wherein class solidarity won out over noblesse oblige.77 The 
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Statutes are therefore marked by the broad application of their paternalism, which granted 
protections to a portion of society only cursorily considered in most similar customs. 
This paternalism was more frequently shared in guarantees to freedom of movement 
and traditional agricultural rights. Simon of Montfort abolished throughout his conquests all 
tolls instituted since 1178 and exempted absolutely clerks, religious, pilgrims and knights — 
so long as they did not also trade as merchants.78 Exploitative and novel exactions on travellers 
had been condemned by the Church since the Third Lateran Council in 1179 — hence the 
retroactive period in the Statutes — and their repeal formed an integral part of her peace 
programme for the Midi in 1209.79 When Peter of Aragon, as count of Barcelona, had attempted 
to negotiate further financial commitments from his Catalan subjects to his cash-strapped 
regime in 1205, he offered to admit wrong-doing in the erection of new tolls and cancel them, 
though retaining them for merchants and foreigners. This proposal — like the English 
« Unknown Charter » — would in fact never be promulgated, but its terms are indicative of the 
importance of free passage to contemporary conceptions of responsible government. 80  By 
contrast, Frederick would publish the repeal of all exactions imposed in Sicily since the death 
of his parents in 1197/1198, a generous gesture made easier since, like Simon, he had not 
introduced them in the first place and therefore, unlike Peter, needed admit no fault. 81 In 
addition to liberating travellers from protection money, the Statutes confirmed the usage of 
woods, waters and pastures worked by homines villarum for the past thirty years. Such a wide-
ranging confirmation is not found in any of the cognate documents, perhaps because it went 
without saying. As the process articulated in the Statutes for settling disputes over usage rights 
demonstrates, Simon was anxious to maintain production in the wake of warfare and instability 
and to appeal to the burghers living in his conquered lands, whom he hoped might be a more 
dependable support for his regime than the resentful indigenous nobility.82 But other sources 
also show an interest in access to public commercial and agricultural goods. Magna Carta did 
not just conserve rights, but expanded common possibilities for transportation and cultivation 
by abolishing weirs on English rivers, reclaiming enclosures on riverbanks and disafforesting 
land afforested by King John. The Cheshire Charter likewise gave Ranulf of Chester’s barons, 
knights and freemen the right to assart forests and gather wood on their lands. 83  Less 
generously, Andrew of Hungary promised in the Golden Bull not to put his pigs to pannage in 
the woods or fields of his sergeants without their permission.84 The Statutes of Pamiers seem 
here to fall between their English and Hungarian counterparts. While not laying out a 
comprehensive programme for agricultural expansion, they nevertheless recognise and 
reinforce established rights. 
However, the preservation of these rights went hand in hand with attendant taxation and 
labour obligations. After all, agricultural production did not benefit only or even primarily the 
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cultivators. According to the Statutes, a lord could continue to expect the customary jornalia, 
or agricultural labour on his demesne lands required from his tenants, though he was to provide 
their nourishment while they were so employed. Simon of Montfort also reinforced traditional 
census payments, imposing a 5s. penalty on the tenant for each term that they were in arrears. 
After three years of nonpayment, the lord could confiscate the farm to give, sell or keep; in the 
latter case he was bound to restore it to the tenant upon full payment of their unpaid census 
along with the accumulated penalties.85 Such clauses present safeguards for the rights and 
revenues of the lord, as well as for the just treatment of the tenant. Unsurprisingly, the object 
of the Statutes — as with all of the customs examined here — was reform, not revolution. 
But this distinction should not prevent the recognition of their innovative procedures of 
appeal against abuse. In tandem with the conservative retention of traditional obligations came 
the restriction or repeal of excessive exactions by lords. Simon of Montfort forbad the lords to 
whom he had granted lands in the Midi from demanding more tallage from their subjects than 
had been agreed at the new lords’ enfeoffment. 86  Likewise, Magna Carta required all 
administrative divisions in the realm to maintain their ancient farms, restricted the levying of 
aids from tenants, limited demands for service from free tenements and forbad the seizure of 
corn and possessions by constables and bailiffs. The Forest Charter issued by the minority 
government of King Henry III in 1217, in addition to facilitating agricultural exploitation of 
forested land and moderating penalties for poaching, reiterates the prohibition against 
confiscation of animals and produce by royal agents.87 Ranulf of Chester also put an end to 
demands for sheaves of corn and other impositions by comital beadles and sergeants, restricting 
the number of and consumption by the latter in his barons’ lands.88 Again, the Albigensian 
Crusade and the baronial reform movement in England produced the closest parallels in 
consideration of the protection of the labouring classes from arbitrary exactions. 
As with the references to justice, all these intentions would be just air without measures 
to enforce them. Simon therefore promised to investigate complaints of abuse and compel lords 
to restore what they had unjustly taken. The subjects of indigenous lords were likewise 
empowered to appeal to him in the same circumstances. Most remarkably, the Statutes grant 
the poor access to advocates, preserving their access to the courts.89 The Golden Bull decrees 
the deposition of corrupt royal counts, or ispánok, while Andrew’s reissue of the liberties in 
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1231 provides for peasant courts to protect husbandmen from abuses by the servants of elites.90 
In England, Peter de Brus promised to remove and replace any of his administrators who might 
violate the liberties he had granted to Cleveland. The barons at Runnymede implemented 
oversight for royal abuses, establishing local committees of twelve knights to investigate and 
abolish omnes male consuetudines and a council of twenty-five barons to examine cases of 
unlawful disseisin, fines and amercements. Potential royal resistance to reform was to be 
forcibly overcome by this same security council. These mechanisms suggest that, in the words 
of Carpenter, « [t]he barons believed certainly in justice and judgement, but most strongly when 
it came to themselves ».91 As in England, barons across Christendom insisted on accountable 
government through the recording of enforcement measures to guarantee promises of their own 
liberties; sometimes, as in the Statutes or the Brus charter for Cleveland, this accountability 
even protected those of others. 
The Statutes go even further in recording the right of those liable to tallage — both free 
and unfree — to take matters into their own hands. They could unilaterally leave their lands for 
the lordship of another, though only freemen were allowed to take their moveable goods with 
them: serfs could transfer only their own persons. Emigrants could not be pursued, and lords 
were forbidden from compelling pledges from their men to stay.92 Such freedom of movement 
was not unique to the crusader Midi. In 1196, Count Louis I of Blois and Chartres, a fellow 
crusader with Simon of Montfort and Baldwin of Flanders, had exempted the residents of 
Châteaudun from tallage, emancipated the serfs there and allowed anyone to settle in the newly 
enfranchised town. Around the same time, customs were recorded in the southern towns of 
Pexioria, Fendeille and Saint-Gaudens offering to free immigrating peasants. This principle of 
Stadtluft macht frei was widely, though not universally, recognised throughout Europe at the 
turn of the century.93 Ranulf of Chester and his barons, while happy to allow peasants from 
outside Cheshire to resettle on — and work — their lands, attempted to discourage the liberation 
of serfs bound for Chester itself; finally, however, they had to admit their freedom should they 
live in the town for a year and a day.94 But while these grants share a general thrust, the Statutes’ 
provisions again stand slightly apart. Their aim is not emancipation: freedom of movement is 
open to both free and unfree, and the right to leave one’s lord does not exempt a man from 
tallage, but rather creates a more favourable labour market. Lords now came under pressure to 
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restrain their tallages as they competed for subjects. While these clauses initially appear less 
liberal than the town franchises prevalent elsewhere, the very fact that they are not tied to 
particular settlements make the opportunities they offer more universal. They therefore attest 
an independent approach to the contemporary baronial trend of granting agency to peasants in 
order to encourage urban growth and curb the power of subordinate lords. 
These economic and even political motives, while probably necessary, are nevertheless 
insufficient to explain the proliferation of written customs such as the Statutes of Pamiers in 
the early thirteenth century. No doubt Simon of Montfort used the Statutes to bolster his foreign 
regime with support from the Third Estate in the face of widespread aristocratic opposition. 
The rebellious English barons in Magna Carta likely tried to do the same, instigating petty 
knights, tenants and burghers against King John.95 But genuine noblesse oblige almost certainly 
played a role as well. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Cistercian apologist for Simon and the 
Albigensian Crusade, claims that the reforms of Pamiers were especially necessary in the 
context of the Midi, terra siquidem illa ab antiquis diebus depredationibus patuerat et rapinis; 
opprimebat quippe potens inpotentem, fortior minus fortem. This is clearly propaganda, but the 
picture Peter paints was not without truth. 96  Nor were Simon and his peers immune to 
obligations to protect the lives and goods of their subjects. It is hard to see how the Statutes’ 
protection of poor widows from tallage offered material benefit to Simon’s regime, while to 
rule justly was an integral part of the baronial rank in the social hierarchy.97 The commitment 
of early thirteenth-century written customs to justice — understood not only in judicial 
procedure but across all political activity — is unsurprising in itself. 
What requires more investigation is why the kings and barons behind these documents 
so frequently raised similar questions about the practice of justice, if not always reaching the 
same conclusions. Some scholars of Magna Carta have suggested one possible source in the 
clerical and scholastic ideas emerging at this time from the continental universities; certainly 
the Church played a crucial role in disseminating and preserving the Charter.98 But Miss Susan 
Reynolds suggests that while « [i]n thirteenth-century Europe academics analysed and refined 
their society’s principles…the basic norms did not…come from them. » Instead, these norms 
were « in the air », echoing Holt’s judgement that the liberties codified in these documents 
« were part of the very atmosphere » of thirteenth-century politics.99 By contrast, Prof. Martyn 
Rady rightly points out that this « atmosphere » necessitates shared political circumstances 
across different contexts, a condition that this comparative study has demonstrated existed in 
some, but by no means all, cases.100 The appeal to something « in the air » likewise does not 
account for the sudden proliferation of written customs during this period. 
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It is profitable, therefore, to return to an examination of the importance of Christianity 
to the articulation of these legal currents. Both the Statutes of Pamiers and Magna Carta place 
a protection of ecclesiastical liberties first and foremost among their provisions. Far from being 
« a necessary bow to the Church », these privileges are essential to the nature of the grants.101 
In the Statutes, the liberty of the Church — not only from heretics but also from pre-Gregorian 
practices of lay interference — was the foundation of the entire negotium pacis et fidei upon 
which the Albigensian Crusade was based.102 Meanwhile, Carpenter argues that — thanks to 
the intervention of Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, cardinal-priest of San 
Chrisogono and master of Paris — the freedom of the English Church was made an a priori 
condition of Magna Carta, one that would remain even should the king cavil over the 
implementation of the rest of the Charter.103 In both the crusader Midi and baronial England, 
just government depended on the neogregorian vision of Church liberty. 
Ecclesiastical interests were also given definite shape. The legacy of Saint Thomas 
Becket, archbishop of Canterbury, appears in the Midi among the Statutes of Pamiers and even 
as far away as Hungary, where Andrew exempted the clergy from temporal justice in a separate 
charter of 1222.104 On 22 November 1220, the same day as his imperial coronation in Rome, 
Frederick II promulgated from San Pietro in Vaticano a ringing endorsement of the 
neogregorian liberties of the Church. Shock at such a document from this future « Antichrist » 
is anachronistic: the emperor was still marked by the tutelage of Innocent III rather than the 
coming conflict with Gregory IX. His subsequent Assizes of Capua repeat the imperial 
guarantee of independent ecclesiastical justice in Sicily, though those of Messina prescribe the 
laicisation of blaspheming clerks and their relaxation to the temporal arm, including potential 
mutilation.105 In England, despite Becket’s influence on Langton, clerical immunity does not 
appear in Magna Carta, which goes only so far as to restrict the amercement of clerks in civil 
suits to their temporal property, thereby preserving their spiritual benefices.106 The Statutes, 
however, exempt clerks — save those who are merchants or unchaste, once again mirroring 
reform priorities — from tallage on any temporal inheritance that should come to them. 
Ecclesiastical serfs are likewise spared from tallage, a freedom also found in the Golden Bull.107 
The Statutes characteristically preserve or restore ecclesiastical firstfruits and tithes. The 
Assizes of Capua similarly protect the tithes owed under King William II the Good, while the 
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Golden Bull likely forbids usurpation of episcopal tithes for the royal stables.108 The Great 
Charter of England, as noted above, may occupy a more « liberal » position with respect to 
social distinctions among freemen or agricultural usage rights, but the Statutes — and, perhaps 
surprisingly, their Hungarian cognate — make more generous and explicit provision for the 
Church. 
No doubt much of this is owed to the fact that ecclesiastical liberty was a battle that had 
largely been won in England, while Hungary and the crusader Midi still worked to bring 
themselves in line with the rest of Latin Christendom on this point. But the arc of this tendency 
is itself indicative of a contemporary movement toward a particular vision of Christianity that 
lay behind all these documents. Reynolds is characteristically cautious about this attribution, 
sensibly observing that « much as medieval society was marked by the teachings of the Church, 
that does not mean that all the values and norms that had been held before Christianization 
disappeared or become overlaid after it was accepted. »109 It need hardly be remarked that 
discussions of justice, for example, predate Christianity in both Roman and Germanic contexts. 
However, Christianity inevitably redirected and reshaped these discussions as it inherited them. 
Most marked, perhaps, is the emphasis on the protection of the vulnerable discussed above: 
following St Augustine, political action became a divinely ordained means for correcting 
violence and restoring peace, rather than essential to the flourishing of the community in a 
perpetually competitive symbiosis. Provision must therefore be made for the pauperes [spiritu], 
rather than simply the net benefit of oneself or one society; concern for the poor and suffering 
became « entrenched and assumed norms ».110 Of course, in this world of sin, law and force 
remained necessary, and so other vulnerable communities emerged: the persecution of heretics, 
examined above, was an act of charity, intended to recall them from the violence of error into 
the peace of Christ, while the exclusion and disadvantaging of Jews, reaffirmed at Lateran IV, 
is a common theme in customs and liberties from England to Hungary.111 Like any monotheistic 
faith, Christianity had profound political consequences, which only intensified over the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries. 
Some of the aims of the neogregorian reform championed by the Cistercians, the 
schoolmen and Pope Innocent III have already been outlined above. The impact of these ideals 
for lay Christian behaviour can be clearly seen in the actions of barons such as Simon of 
Montfort and others.112 The warnings of Holt and Reynolds not to seek the inspiration of these 
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liberties and customs in academic commentaries is well-taken, but need not prevent recognition 
of a shift in active Christian piety in which both scholastic clerks and lay nobles participated. 
The Church and the aristocracy, though they might inhabit two cultures in certain respects, 
shared a single society. The political principles of the barons might be derived « from parents 
and neighbours, and…inculcated from childhood », but then so too were those of the Cistercian 
monks or Paris masters, who often came from the same aristocratic families.113 As Andrew 
Willard Jones demonstrates, attempts to divorce the medieval « secular » from the « sacred » 
are doomed to frustration, a point which suggests that any picture of unidirectional influence 
from clergy to laity in the evolution of Christian ideals, however much it was promoted by 
clerical reformers, is incomplete.114 When speaking of a « neogregorian Church », it must be 
remembered that this concept includes both clergy and laity as active participants. 
A prominent vehicle and expression of this shared evolution of ideals was the crusade. 
The Cistercians had played a crucial role in preaching since the Second Crusade, while the 
importance of the Paris schools had grown since the Third. At the turn of the thirteenth century, 
masters such as Fulk of Neuilly and Robert of Courson especially connected the crusade with 
moral — and therefore, among the aristocracy, political — reform.115 The crusade thus created 
a space for nobles to hear preaching that dignified their chivalric station while also enjoining 
on them moral obligations for holy living in the world. In turn, crusading knights on campaign 
mixed with each other and with crusade preachers, who often accompanied the armies as papal 
legates, inevitably sharing their independent experiences and aspirations as political actors. 
Significantly, all of the liberties and customs under consideration here have strong 
crusade connections. The Livre au roi and Assizes of Antioch, while not composed by 
crusaders, were written in Outremer, destination of most men who took the cross. The 
Albigensian context of the Statutes of Pamiers is similarly obvious, but Simon of Montfort also 
sailed to the Holy Land as a member of the Fourth Crusade. On the Adriatic leg of this journey 
he accompanied Baldwin of Hainaut, whose Feudal and Penal Charters were issued five months 
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after he had taken the cross in February 1200.116 John of England and Ranulf of Chester were 
also signed with the cross in 1215 as the king attempted to stave off baronial rebellion. Both 
men advertised their crusader status in their charters of that year; the king would use his to 
plead for delays in restitutions demanded by Magna Carta.117 John’s crusade never materialised, 
but Ranulf led an English contingent composed of both loyalists and former rebels to Egypt on 
the Fifth Crusade in 1218. Among the latter, or following shortly after, were seven of the 
twenty-five barons on Magna Carta’s security council.118 One of these was Robert fitz Walter, 
who, as military leader of the revolt in 1215, had styled himself marescallus exercitus Dei et 
sancte ecclesie in Anglia, a title which signals a pretended union of clerical and baronial 
purpose and perhaps even a homegrown crusade; his loyalist opponents, including Ranulf, at 
the battle of Lincoln in 1217 likewise adopted a crusading identity.119 Andrew of Hungary also 
participated in the Fifth Crusade five years before issuing the Golden Bull, and while his time 
in Syria was brief, his career had been haunted by the cross for over twenty years.120 No doubt 
many of those pressuring him to issue the Golden Bull were also veterans of the eastern 
expedition. Like Andrew, Frederick of Sicily spent over a decade signed with the cross, and he 
issued the Assizes of Capua and Messina amidst renewed enthusiasm for the fulfilment of his 
vow.121 The crusade, as one lay expression of reform, correlates closely with recorded attempts 
at good government. 
One should not assume that cross-pollination inspired and facilitated by the crusade 
always resulted in consensus. The examples studied above reveal multiple points of divergence 
of greater and lesser significance due to particular circumstances and priorities. The campaign 
against usury, a practice long condemned by Christianity, offers an especially salient caution. 
Peter of Aragon forbad usurers from testifying in the Montepessulan court in 1204, though 
suppression of the practice itself was half-hearted.122 Baldwin of Flanders had gone further, 
outlawing usurers in his lands, cancelling interest on any loans contracted since Christmas 1198 
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and protecting debtors from an immediate recall of the principal by an imposed gradual 
repayment until 1203.123 Given the shared interest of these men in the struggle against Islam, 
the close ties of Peter and Montpellier with the papacy of Innocent III, and Baldwin’s — though 
certainly not Peter’s — commitment to sexual continence, such anti-usury measures might be 
attributed to neogregorian zeal. This interpretation could hardly apply, however, to Frederick 
of Sicily’s prohibition in 1231, part of a new constitution for his kingdom with a very different 
perspective on reform, no doubt influenced by the idiosyncratic experience of his 
excommunicate crusade and subsequent war with the Apostolic See. Indeed, Frederick’s 
expansive criminalisation of usury, unlike that of his ancestor William the Good, deliberately 
avoids mention of papal teaching on the matter and permits Jews to continue collecting interest 
in violation of Lateran IV.124 This seems calculated to declare royal independence of action 
from ecclesiastical influence. On the other hand, Simon of Montfort, a man keen to advertise 
his cooperation with the Church, hardly lifted a finger to curb usury in the Midi during the 
Albigensian Crusade, despite the projects of ecclesiastical allies such as Bishop Fulk of 
Toulouse or Robert of Courson, now cardinal-priest of Santo Stefano al Monte Celio. Simon 
forbad its excesses in prohibiting the arrest of any man for the debt of his lord, unless he were 
himself an explicit guarantor or debtor, but this was hardly an innovation. No doubt his 
reluctance to go further owed something to his heavy reliance on credit to fund his own 
incessant campaigns; even his fellow Albigensian Crusader, Walter Langton, brother of 
Archbishop Stephen, borrowed at interest from Jews. 125  But these compromises make 
Baldwin’s edict on the eve of his own vow all the more impressive. One must therefore avoid 
positing a homogeneous neogregorian reform « movement », even while acknowledging the 
strength of connections formed around the crusade and a resulting tendency toward deeper 
expression of Christian practice in lay politics. 
Despite variation reflecting particular circumstances and concerns, one universal trait 
of the customs and liberties discussed above is so obvious it perhaps goes unnoticed: they were 
all written down. A century and a half before, the original Gregorian reform had emphasised 
the importance of truth — associated with written Scripture, patristic opinion and Roman law 
— over oral custom.126 However, it furnished no such wealth of lay documents, at least not at 
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the baronial level. Since then, written culture had exploded, and literacy amongst lay élites had 
grown correspondingly. Even those who remained illiterate or engaged with literacy only 
superficially could participate in a sort of aristocratic « textual community » facilitated by 
common crusading ideals and experience.127 Moreover, the very necessity for a term such as 
« neogregorian » — like « Gregorian », admittedly a modern category — helps to explain the 
change: reform was no longer the preserve of the Church, but impinged upon lay behaviour and 
involved lay participation at a more profound level.128 The ideas espoused in these documents 
were not necessarily new, but their appearance in earlier sources is limited. 129  Their 
proliferation in the early thirteenth century was the result of the conjunction of this new 
emphasis on Christian morality with the increasing importance of written monuments. When 
requesting liberties, petitioners demanded they be set down on parchment rather than 
remembered by elders in order to fortify them with the new, literate standards of authority. 
Custom was no longer discovered through constant consultation, but enshrined in immutable 
ink by rulers.130 In many cases this was simply the translation of oral into written processes, but 
it also allowed reformers to alter the political fabric — sometimes dramatically — whether 
under the guise of conservatism, as did Aimery of Jerusalem, or nakedly, as did Simon of 
Montfort. In a culture that increasingly privileged literacy, once written down such customs and 
liberties would, in theory, be more resistant to challenge, and the reform they embodied might 
endure. 
Most of these customs and liberties did not in fact endure. The abortive legacy of the 
Statutes of Pamiers has been discussed in the introduction. The Livre au roi was issued for the 
rump of a doomed kingdom and seems to have been deliberately ignored in essential points by 
the legal practice of succeeding generations in Outremer. 131  The « Unknown Charter » of 
Barcelona was stillborn.132 Magna Carta, in its 1215 form, was revoked by the pope just over 
two months after it was sealed.133 The Assizes of Antioch do not even survive in their original 
language, extant only in a later Armenian translation. 134  Despite its importance to the 
constitutional history of Hungary, the very authenticity of the Golden Bull was a point of debate 
until the early nineteenth century.135 With the exception of Magna Carta and the Golden Bull, 
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the obsolescence of these customs has in some ways preserved them, allowing the historian to 
see more clearly their significance to contemporaries. 
In centring this comparative study on the Statutes of Pamiers, the intention has been to 
explore the content of these cognate documents with as little anachronism as possible. While 
many of the elements most interesting to modern commentators — inheritance in the Statutes, 
due process in Magna Carta, revocation of privileges in the Assizes of Capua, right of resistance 
in the Golden Bull — were of great importance to medieval legislators, their sense could vary 
considerably across contexts, most especially from that of the twenty-first century. In common 
among these early thirteenth-century customs and liberties was a commitment to reform — 
written reform — by politically engaged lay élites, barons as well as kings. This reform might 
be oriented toward various, often overlapping, aims: military effectiveness, political 
accountability, justice within and without the court and Christian morality. 
What has perhaps gone unnoticed by previous historians is the extent to which the final 
concern underpinned the others. Good government had always been tied to morality, but by the 
end of the twelfth century, this connection was increasingly articulated in ways that penetrated 
deeper and deeper into lay behaviour. Nor should this be seen as a clerical conquest abetted by 
the slavish obedience of the laity, who reflected the spirit more often than the letter of 
ecclesiastical conceptions of reform. The thirteenth would be the century not only of 
Frederick II, whose peculiar relationship to neogregorian prescriptions has already been 
mentioned, but also of St Louis, who never allowed his clergy to lead him around by the nose. 
Like the royal saint, Simon of Montfort was seen as a paragon of Christian virtue in his time, 
though modern historiography has translated this judgement into « a narrow-minded zealot » 
or, even less charitably, « a self-righteous, sanctimonious prig ».136 But if his crowning — 
albeit short-lived — constitutional achievement is any indication of his sentiments, he was in 
many ways a man of his time, balancing present security and future salvation through the 
codification of a reformed political Christianity. 
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